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Denver Journal
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
Venezuela and the Andean Common Market
BEVERLY MAY CARL* and LAWRENCE JOHNSON**
Since the founding of the Andean Common Market in
1969, one member, Chile, has withdrawn while another more
prosperous neighbor, Venezuela, has opted to join the Market.
Chile is doubtlessly suffering her own unique withdrawal symp-
toms. This article, however, will focus on the legislative and
commercial adjustments which had to be made by Venezuela
to integrate into a preexisting common market.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Theoretical Basis for Common Markets in Developing
Regions
Regional economic integration units such as the Andean
Common Market can be of major importance to the economic
development of less developed countries.' These integration
schemes are intended to promote economic growth through the
division and specialization of labor. The elimination of internal
trade barriers should also provide the potential investor with a
* Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University; J.D., University of Southern
California; LL.M., Yale University.
** J.D., Southern Methodist University.
1. Formation of the Andean Common Market was designed to accelerate the
economic integration of its members within the broader context of the Latin American
Free Trade Association (LAFTA). Treaty Establishing a Free Trade Area and Institut-
ing The Latin American Free Trade Association (Montevideo Treaty, 1960). This
treaty has been printed in Inter-American Institute of Legal Studies, Instruments
Relating to The Integration of Latin America 207 (1968). LAFTA's primary goal was
to reduce tariff and trade barriers among member countries by 1973 (this date later
extended to 1980 by the Caracas Protocol). See S. DELL, A LATIN AMERICAN COMMON
MARKET? (1966); W. KRAUSE & F. MATHIS, LATIN AMERICA AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:
REGIONAL PLANNING FOR DEVELOPMENT (1970); LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:
EXPERIENCES AND PROSPECTS (M. Wionczek ed. 1966); WALTER & VrrzTHUM, THE CEN-
TRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET: A CASE STUDY ON ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN DEVELOP-
ING REGIONS (N.Y.U., C.J. Devine Inst. of Finance, Bull. No. 44, May 1967).
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larger market2 in which to sell its products. Because of econom-
ies of scale, a company can then produce each item at a lower
per unit cost. Since the individual product will thus be
cheaper, more people can buy it. This means more profit to the
manufacturer who can then reinvest such funds.
Protected access to regional markets opens the possibility
for new investment to take place in industries which would not
be viable if confined to individual national markets.3 Also, the
resulting economies of scale and degree of specialization may
even reduce production costs for preexisting industries. In due
time this cost reduction should make the products of these
industries competitive in world markets.
The importance of economies of scale should be stressed.4
The national markets of most less developed countries are too
limited to provide an adequate volume of demand for cost effi-
cient mass production industries. Given the situation of a small
self-contained national market, the tendency is usually for
local industry to seek a high degree of protection from outside
sources of competition. Such protection then fosters low prod-
uctivity and artificially high costs. Regional economic integra-
tion tries to solve these problems by 'Making it possible to es-
tablish modern plants of optimum size, with an adequate level
of specialization, and to industrialize in those sectors where it
was not previously feasible due to domestic market limita-
tions.'
Proponents of regional economic integration units contend
that formation of such units will play a direct role in alleviating
those conditions which currently restrict economic growth and
development! Not only will overall market conditions be
greatly improved, but also the combined economic power of the
integrated unit will permit it to bargain more effectively with
outside nations on trade and investment questions.
B. Organization of ANCOM
The basic structure of the Andean Common Market
2. S. DELL, supra note 1 at 17.
3. Id. at 17-18.
4. Id. at 18.
5. UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA, DEVELOPMENT PROB-
LEMS IN LATIN AMERICA 156 (1970).
6. Id. at 160.
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(ANCOM) was established by the Cartagena Agreement of
1969.! The initial members were Colombia, Chile, Peru, Ecua-
dor, and Bolivia. Although Venezuela participated in the nego-
tiations on that accord, she decided not to sign or ratify it at
that time.
The aim of ANCOM was to achieve formation of a func-
tional subregional common market, carefully intertwined with
the larger preexisting Latin American Free Trade Association
(LAFTA).8 Members of LAFTA not included in ANCOM are
Mexico, Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil, Uruguay, and, today,
Chile. All legal obligations incurred under LAFTA remain in
effect under the ANCOM charter.'
Techniques to create a common market within the Andean
region include internal free trade, a common external tariff,
regional allocation of selected industries, and harmonization of
certain laws.' 0 Implementation of these objectives is entrusted
to the two principal administrative institutions, the Commis-
sion and the Board (or Junta)." The Commission, the highest
authority in ANCOM, is comprised of one cabinet level repre-
sentative from each member country. It is charged with formu-
lating general policy, resolving disputes and ensuring imple-
mentation of the Cartagena Agreement. 2 The Board, a perma-
nent three member body selected by the Commission, is re-
sponsible for developing proposals for submission to the Com-
mission. 3 These draft proposals, if approved by the Commis-
sion, are promulgated as its official Decisions. 4
7. Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, signed May 26, 1969, reprinted
in 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 910-39 (1969) [hereinafter referred to as the Cartagena Agree-
ment].
8. Id. art. 110.
9. Id. art. 114.
10. Id. arts. 1-3.
11. Id. art. 5.
12. Id. arts. 6-12.
13. Id. arts. 7(c), 13-18.
14. Although the word "Decision" has been translated into the English
"Decision," the American reader should not confuse these "decisions" with our admin-
istrative or judicial decisions. In fact, the so-called Decisions of ANCOM are suprana-
tional legislation. The Andean Commission's Decisions, of which over 100 have been
issued to date, should be distinguished from the Venezuelan Decrees which are domes-
tic legislation enacted by the Venezuelan Congress. In many cases Venezuelan Decrees
specifically embody the previously promulgated Decisions of the Andean Commission.
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C. Venezuela's Accession
Venezuela's decision to join ANCOM was announced by
President Caldera in 1973. This was by no means universally
acclaimed within the country. Bitter political and economic
disputes raged over the anticipated ills or benefits of Venezue-
lan membership in the subregional common market.15 The de-
cision to join ANCOM in 1973 and the earlier decision to join
LAFTA in 1968 represented a major change in attitude by Ven-
ezuela toward regional economic integration units. Domestic
political pressures" from private commercial interests 7 had
previously caused Venezuela to refrain from joining the larger
integration units of LAFTA and ANCOM. However, by 1972,
it had become apparent to many of the nation's decisionmakers
that participation in these organizations was essential if Vene-
zuela were to continue its economic growth and to avoid exclu-
sion from important trading markets.
President Caldera's 1973 action represented a complete
reversal of the position taken four years earlier by his ruling
Social Christian Party (COPEI) toward ANCOM. This change
was somewhat confusing at the time it was made, since
COPEI's main rival, the Accion Democratica (AD) had pre-
viously gone on record in 1969 as being strongly in favor of
Venezuelan membership in ANCOM. COPEI's abrupt about-
face opened it to charges of political opportunism. All of this
debate took place within the heated controversy of the upcom-
ing 1973 national elections."5
15. Venezuelans Form Battle Lines on Joining ANCOM, 1971 Bus. LATIN AMERICA
272.
16. Venezuela's early attitude is somewhat reflected in a 1960 Statement by an
official of the Bank of Venezuela: "Any common market or free trade area will leave
us producing nothing but petroleum and iron ore, and importing everything else. Our
textiles cannot compete with Brazilian textiles, our coffee cannot compete with Colom-
bian coffee and our meat cannot compete with Uruguayan meat. For us a free trade
area is utopian at the present time." BANCO DE VENEZUELA, BOLETIN DE ECONOMIA Y
FINANZAS, Sept. 1960.
17. However, it would appear the stakes were not really that significant. One and
one-half years after its entry in ANCOM Venezuelan trade with ANCOM countries
had accounted for only 2% of Venezuela's exports and only 1% of the country's total
imports. Ecuador and Peru take most of Venezuela's ANCOM exports, while Colombia
and Peru provide the bulk of her ANCOM imports. INVESTING, LICENSING & TRADING
CONDITIONS ABROAD (Bus. INT'L), Venezuela 21 (Aug. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
IL&T].
18. Venezuelans Form Battle Lines on Joining ANCOM, supra note 15.
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Domestic political considerations were strongly influenced
by the economic interests perceived to be at stake by the var-
ious opposing groups. COPEI's new position toward member-
ship in ANCOM met with bitter resistance by the private sec-
tor business interests. These private interests voiced their op-
position through the federation of chambers of commerce
(FEDECAMARAS) and the Asociacion Venezolana de Indus-
trias (an industrial group representing Venezuela's medium-
sized industries)."
The private sector representatives predicted that Venezue-
lan membership in ANCOM would result in economic disaster.
It was claimed that Venezuela's unique political and economic
system was incompatible with those of the other ANCOM
countries. Factors cited in support of this claim included Vene-
zuela's economic independence based on its petroleum wealth
and proven ability to pay for imports, a traditionally low infla-
tion rate, an allegedly narrower industrial base than its three
potential rivals within ANCOM (Colombia, Chile, and Peru),
and an alleged inability to compete with the other subregional
producers because of higher production costs (especially labor).
Also, the private sector contended that ANCOM's restrictive
measures on foreign investment (especially technology trans-
fer) would only discourage new investment and technology at
a time when Venezuela was in need of both.2
The private sector spokesmen relied upon two particularly
emotional issues to advance their cause.2' The first one raised
the prospect of free movement of labor among the ANCOM
countries. This claim was obviously intended to raise the spec-
ter of a loss of jobs for Venezuelans. Given the fact that Vene-
zuela was then, and still is today, beset by the rather severe
problems of Colombians illegally working in Venezuela, the
threat was perceived by many workers as being real. This fear
was, however, unjustified since the Cartagena Agreement does
not provide for the free movement of labor.
The second issue, and the one which most concerned small
19. Id.
20. Summary and Highlights of Seminar on the Andean Pact Held at the Ameri-
can Chamber of Commerce of Peru on June 6, 1973 (Lima, Peru), in ANDEAN PACT:
DEFINITION, DESIGN, AND ANALYSIS 77, 78-79 (Council of the Americas ed. 1973).
21. Venezuelans Form Battle Lines on Joining ANCOM, supra note 15.
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and medium-sized businessmen was the reduction or disap-
pearance of high protective tariffs vis-a-vis other ANCOM na-
tions for manufacturers. As in many developing nations, these
manufacturers were import substitution oriented. Private in-
dustrial spokesmen questioned their ability to compete with
cheaper imports from other ANCOM countries. Further, the
opponents claimed, Venezuelan and foreign capital would flow
toward those countries with cheaper labor.
COPEI's new attitude toward ANCOM was strongly sup-
ported by representatives of heavy industries, whose larger
manufacturing capacities would need additional marketing
outlets. Due to diminishing petroleum reserves, Venezuela
wished to diversify its economic base. Membership in
ANCOM, by providing an expanded market, hopefully would
encourage not only major producers for the entire region, but
also stimulate a number of local satellite industries. 2 The pos-
sibility of obtaining exclusive or semi-exclusive assignments of
particular industries under ANCOM's Sectorial Program was
perceived as an additional means of furthering the nation's
economic growth.23
In deciding to join ANCOM, the Venezuelan Government
apparently made two basic assumptions.2 4 First, it perceived
Venezuela as becoming economically isolated in Latin America
if it did not join. Should ANCOM become economically viable,
then Venezuela would be in the unenviable position of having
to compete in the international market against this powerful
economic force, as well as against the traditional Latin Ameri-
can economic powers (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico). Second,
Venezuela was confident of its ability to compete inside
ANCOM, possibly even dominate it, yet still preserve its na-
tional sovereignty. In the two years since Venezuela has been
a member of ANCOM there has been a noticeable change in
attitude by the previous opponents. It appears that opposition
has subsided and that emphasis today is placed on working
within the framework of the system and deriving to the fullest
extent possible those economic benefits which are available.
22. Note 20 supra.
23. Id. at 83, 85-86.
24. Id. at 79, 83.
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II. LEGAL ADAPTATIONS MADE By VENEZUELA
Since becoming a member of ANCOM in 1973,5 Venezuela
has had to enact new legislation to fulfill its obligations as a
member of the organization. Following is a description and
analysis of such legislation. Within this context, four major
areas of law and economic policy are considered: (A) internal
free trade; (B) common external tariff policy; (C) sectorial pro-
grams; and (D) control of foreign investment.
A. Internal Free Trade
By definition, an integral component of a common market
is a customs union. A customs union consists of internal free
trade among its member states and a common external tariff
erected around the entire region against products from outside
the area. Thus, the first essential step in creating the Andean
Common Market was to establish a mechanism to achieve in-
ternal free trade among its members. To provide adequate pro-
tection to existing industries, the internal free trade goal is
achieved in most customs unions through a gradual process of
internal duty reductions.
The ANCOM documents refer to this element of internal
free trade as "subregional trade liberalization." The ANCOM
structure uses four different, but complementary, mechanisms
to reach this objective for Venezuela, Colombia, and Peru"6 by
1983 and for Bolivia and Ecuador17 by 1988. For this purpose
all products are divided into four distinct categories: (1) goods
on LAFTA's Common Schedule; (2) goods reserved for the Sec-
torial Programs; (3) goods not produced in the region; and (4)
the remaining nonscheduled goods. By December 1970, all non-
tariff barriers (e.g., quotas) were to have been removed.28
25. Final Act of the Negotiations on the Entry of Venezuela into the Cartagena
Agreement done Feb. 13, 1973, reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MAT'L5 344 (1973)
[hereinafter referred to as the Accession Agreement]. This Agreement, the Cartegena
Agreement, and ANCOM Decisions Nos. 24, 37, 37-A, 40, 46, 50, 56, and 70 were
approved by the Venezuelan Congress and President on September 3, 1973. Gac. Of
1,620 of Nov. 1, 1973, [1973] Gaceta Legal No. 357, at 2 (Ven.), reprinted in G. Pico
MANTILLA, LEGISLACION ANDINA DE INVERSIONES EXTRANJERAS Y TECNOLOGIA 265 (1975).
26. Lima Protocol Amending the Cartagena Agreement, done Oct. 30, 1976, art.
8, reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 235 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as the Lima
Protocol]. The following textual discussion reflects the latest changes incorporated in
the Lima Protocol, ratification of which is currently pending before the Venezuelan
Legislature. Ancom Implements Investment Code Rules But Falters on Sectorials,
1978 Bus. LAIN AMERICA 116.
27. Id. art. 9.
28. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 42 and 46; Accession Agreement,
supra note 25, Annex B, art. 38.
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1. LAFTA Common Schedule Goods
Under the LAFTA Treaty, the member states were re-
quired at three-year intervals to agree on lists of goods which
were to circulate duty free within the LAFTA region;29 these
lists were designated the "Common Schedules." At each of
these three-year sessions, the members were to have agreed to
place on these Common Schedules goods amounting to 25% of
the aggregate value of all trade within the region.10 Had that
objective been fulfilled, by 1973 there would have been total
free internal trade within the LAFTA region.
The 1964 negotiations succeeded in placing only 175
items3 on the LAFTA Common Schedule. The second Com-
mon Schedule negotiations, planned for 1967, never took
place.32
Since the ANCOM members were still bound by their
LAFTA obligations, the Cartagena Agreement provided that
all goods included in the first stage of the LAFTA Common
Schedules, i. e. the 175 items, would also be free of duties within
the ANCOM region.3 ANCOM's Board is further empowered
to grant similar treatment to any Common Schedules which
may be negotiated in the future.3 4 Under the Accession Agree-
ment, Venezuela was likewise obligated to permit these items
duty free entry.3 5 One should note that these particular articles
may enter Venezuela free of tariffs, not only if they come from
ANCOM members, but also if from any other LAFTA nation,
such as Brazil.
2. Goods Reserved for the Sectorial Programs
Almost 2,000 goods, amounting to about one-third of all
29. Treaty Establishing a Free Trade Area and Instituting the Latin America Free
Trade Association, Feb. 18, 1960, art. 7, printed in INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTER-
NATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, 1 INSTRUMENTS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA
AND IN THE CARRIBEAN 3 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as the Montevideo Treaty].
30. Id.
31. Note, Latin American Experience with Economic Integration, 10 VA. J. INT'L
L. 139, 153 (1969).
32. Id.
33. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, art. 49.
34. Id.
35. Accession Agreement, supra note 25, Annex B, art. 1 (a); see Ven. Decree 338
(1974), Gac. Of. 1,675 Ex. (Aug. 30, 1974); Ven. Decree 339 (1974), Gac. Of. 1,676 Ex.
(Aug. 30, 1974).
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the items on the tariff schedule" have been reserved for the
Sectorial Programs. 37 Each article under the Sectorial Pro-
grams will have its own duty arrangements both for goods pro-
duced inside the ANCOM region and for those coming from
outside the area (see Part fl-C for a detailed description).
Items which were previously reserved for the Sectorial Pro-
grams but which, in fact, have not been incorporated into a
specific Sectorial Program by the end of 1978 will become free
of internal duties under certain conditions.3 Such articles, if
not already produced in the ANCOM area, will circulate duty
free as of December 31, 1978.31 However, the Commission may
authorize the reservation of certain of these items not yet pro-
duced in the region for manufacture by Bolivia and Ecuador'0
and may determine whether such items shall be subject to
internal duties.
The remaining articles, previously reserved for the Sec-
torial Programs but not actually incorporated in a Sectorial
Program by December 1978, will enter Colombia, Peru, and
Venezuela duty free if coming from Bolivia or Ecuador." As to
such items originating in Colombia, Peru, or Venezuela, the
remaining duties should be eliminated by five annual succes-
sive reductions of 5%, 10%, 15%, 30%, and 40% starting by
December 1979, so that they will be duty free within the
region by 1985.42
3. Goods Not Produced in the Region
Goods not produced in the region and not reserved for the
Sectorial Program were to be duty free 3 by 1971. However, the
Commission could reserve certain goods not yet produced in
the region for manufacture by Bolivia or Ecuador; any internal
36. Fulmer, The Andean Common Market: Implications for U.S. Business,
ANDE PACr: DEFINION, DESIGN, AND ANALYSIS 1, 7 (Council of the Americas ed.
1973).
37. See also Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 34, 45(a); Accession Agree-
ment, supra note 25, Annex B, art. 38.
38. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 47, 53; Lima Protocol supra note 26,
art. 4.
39. Lima Protocol, supra note 26, art. 4(a).
40. Id.
41. Id. art. 4(d).
42. Id. art. 4(c).
43. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 50, 52.
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duty structure created for such goods must be for the benefit
of Bolivia or Ecuador."
Products not yet produced in the region and not allocated
to the Sectorial Programs could also be reserved for manufac-
turing by Colombia, Venezuela, or Peru. However, such prod-
ucts when produced by any of these three nations may enjoy
the protection of internal tariff barriers only until the end of
1983.11
4. Nonscheduled Goods
The bulk of the products fall within the nonscheduled
goods category, subject to the automatic tariff cutting provi-
sions. As a first step, each nation had to designate, as its base
rate from which the automatic cuts would be made, the lowest
rate applied by that nation on the item prior to joining
ANCOM." Such base rate, moreover, could not exceed the ad
valorem, CIF, price of the item by more than 100%.11
Annual reductions of duties on nonscheduled goods must
be made by each nation. Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru, start-
ing in December 1976, must make seven successive annual re-
ductions of 6% each and a final reduction of 8% by December
31, 1983. Hence, by the end of 1983 all these nonscheduled
goods should enter Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru duty free.4
Bolivia and Ecuador must begin making the automatic
duty reductions on nonscheduled items with a 5% cut by De-
cember 31, 1979; five cuts of 10% each annually from 1982 to
1986; a 15% cut in December 1987; and a final reduction of 20%
by December 31, 1988."9 Hence, the nonscheduled articles from
ANCOM nations should enter Bolivia and Ecuador duty free
after 1988.
In August 1974, Venezuela began to reduce tariffs for in-
trasubregional trade in compliance with the automatic tariff
cutting program ° In conjunction with the automatic tariff
44. Id.
45. Id.; Accession Agreement, supra note 25, Annex B, art. 1(b); Lima Protocol,
supra note 26, art. 3.
46. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, art. 52(a); Lima Protocol, supra note 26,
art. 3.
47. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, art. 52(a).
48. Lima Protocol, supra note 26, art. 8.
49. Id. art. 9.
50. Decree 339 of Aug. 30, 1974, [19741 Gaceta Legal No. 384, at 36 (Ven.).
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reduction program, Venezuela adopted ANCOM's tariff
nomenclature, referred to as the NABANDINA. This is an
eight-digit code based on the Brussels nomenclature. 5'
An integral part of the automatic tariff reduction program
under the Cartagena Agreement was a list of general and spe-
cific exceptions. Each member was permitted to exempt a cer-
tain number of products until 1988 from the duty reductions;
however, goods on the Common List could not be so ex-
empted. 51
Under the Accession Agreement, Venezuela was allowed to
exclude not more than 250 items. 3 In 1974 she, in fact, ex-
cluded 236 articles from the general tariff reduction program.54
This list seems to be characterized by labor-intensive products
of small and medium-sized industries. Included were such
items as basic foodstuffs, leather goods, yarns and textiles,
footwear, and furniture.
Venezuela was also authorized to exclude an additional
200 items from the tariff cutting on a single country-of-origin
basis. This exceptions list is applied against specified items
from Colombia or Peru.5 These specific exceptions are in-
tended to be short term only.5 Venezuela may not direct spe-
cific tariff discriminations against more than 110 articles from
any one country. 7 Conversely, Peru may apply discriminatory
tariffs against thirty items from Venezuela. Peru may also im-
pose discriminatory duties against an additional number of
items from Venezuela equivalent to the number of products
from Peru against which Venezuela has discriminated. Colom-
bia enjoys the same rights as Peru in this regard.58
For example, assume Venezuela had discriminated against
the maximum permissible number of items from Colombia, i.e.
51. Decree 338 of Aug. 30, 1974, [1974] Gaceta Legal No. 384, at 36 (Ven.).
52. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, art. 55; Lima Protocol, supra note 26, art.
1.
53. Accession Agreement, supra note 25, Annex A, art. 2.
54. IL&T, Venezuela 22 (Aug. 1975); see Ven. Decree 338 (1974), Gac. Of. 1,675
Ex. (Aug. 30, 1974); Ven. Decree 339 (1974), Gac. Of. 1,676 Ex. (Aug. 30, 1974),
implementing the Accession Agreement, supra note 25.
55. Accession Agreement, supra note 25, Annex A, art. 3.
56. Id. art. 8.
57. Id. art. 3(a).
58. Id. art. 4.
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110 articles. Colombia would now be entitled to discriminate
against an additional 110 articles to bring her total discrimina-
tions against Venezuelan products up to 140 different goods.
Venezuela has in fact used this discriminatory power
against certain products from Colombia such as foodstuffs,
beer, lubricants, vinyl fibers, cement, bicycles, and footwear.
Likewise, Venezuela has discriminated against canned fish,
coffee, footwear, copper bars, and various other articles from
Peru."'
Bolivia and Ecuador may also apply discriminatory tariffs
against thirty items from Venezuela. 0 However, if the product
discriminated against by a particular nation is not produced in
that country, the Board of ANCOM may disallow the excep-
tion.'
B. The Common External Tariff
As stated previously, in a customs union, the individual
nations must eventually cease applying their own tariff rates
to goods coming from outside the customs union and create
common tariffs applicable to goods entering any country in the
region. In contrast, under a free trade association, the member
nations, although aiming toward free internal trade among
themselves, will continue to apply their own individual rates
as against products from outside the area. Thus in LAFTA, a
free trade association, the member states continue applying
their own individual duty rates to articles from outside the
region. As a common market, however, ANCOM has to con-
struct common tariffs applicable to goods from outside the
area. This means, for example, Venezuela will eventually have
no individual Venezuelan duties, but will simply apply the
common rate which ANCOM has established for all its mem-
bers in reference to a particular product.
In building this common external tariff, the Cartagena
Agreement provided for a two-step procedure.2 The first step
called for the creation of a minimum common external tariff
for each NABANDINA item. For goods with duty rates below
those established by the minimum common external tariff, the
59. IL&T, Venezuela 22 (Aug. 1975).
60. Accession Agreement, supra note 25, Annex A, art. 5.
61. Id. art. 7.
62. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 60, 61.
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member states were required to have raised their tariffs up to
the level of this minimum common external tariff by 1975.63 For
products with duty rates above those minimum common exter-
nal tariff levels, the individual nations could retain their exist-
ing duties for the time being. Although this requirement was
particularly difficult for Venezuela because of her traditionally
low duty structure, she complied with the obligation in 1974 by
raising most of her duties up to that minimum level.6 4
A special hardship clause in the Cartagena Agreement
makes it possible for a country to seek temporary suspension
of the minimum common external tariff. 5 Venezuela exercised
the right in 1975 when it requested suspension of the minimum
common external tariff on some sixty items. Permission was
granted to suspend it on forty-five of the items. Included in the
suspension list were certain essential raw materials and food-
stuffs. This was permitted because the necessary goods were
not available from other member countries.
The second step in establishing the common tariff against
products from outside the region is the fixing of the final com-
mon external tariffs. The rates ultimately set should be suffi-
ciently high to protect new industries in the region and yet low
enough to permit some foreign competition as an inducement
to increased efficiency on the part of Andean manufacturers.
The ANCOM Commission is to set the rates of the final
common external tariff by the end of December 1978. By De-
cember 31, 1983, Venezuela, Peru, and Colombia must have
brought all their duties into line with that final common tariff;
Bolivia and Ecuador have until 1988 to reach this goal. 7 It
should be noted that neither the minimum nor the final com-
mon external tariffs apply to products reserved for the Sectorial
Programs, since goods under these programs will be governed
by their own special tariff arrangements. 6
63. Id. art. 64.
64. Decree 484 of Oct. 8, 1974, [1974] Gaceta Legal No. 379, at 57 (Ven.); Ven.
Decree 339 (1974), Gac. Of. 1,676 Ex. (Aug. 30, 1974); Accession Agreement, supra note
25, Annex B, art. 8.
65. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, art. 67.
66. Ancom Actions on Outer Tariff Could Aid Firms in the Region, 1975 Bus.
LATIN AMERICA 132.
67. Lima Protocol, supra note 26, art. 2.
68. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 34(f), 46, 65(a).
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As indicated before, ANCOM was meshed into LAFTA so
that all obligations incurred under the LAFTA Treaty still
apply to the ANCOM nations. Thus, the question arises, how
does the ANCOM common external tariff affect imports from
the LAFTA nations which are not members of ANCOM?
Generally, products from LAFTA nations entering the
ANCOM region will be subject to the ANCOM common exter-
nal tariff, with two major exceptions. First, as already ex-
plained, all goods placed on the LAFTA Common List will
circulate duty free within the ANCOM region if they originate
from any LAFTA nation."
However, the LAFTA Treaty provided, in addition to the
Common List, a second technique for reducing internal duties
among its members. Under article 5 of the LAFTA Convention,
each member was obligated to enter into bilateral negotiations
with other member states in which they agreed to reduce duties
on certain items. For example, Venezuela might have negoti-
ated with Brazil to lower the duty on Brazilian widget X enter-
ing Venezuela from 50% to 30%. Once such bilateral agreement
is concluded, under the most favored nations clause of the
LAFTA Agreement,70 Venezuela is required to extend that
most favored nations rate of 30% on widget X's from every
other LAFTA nation. Each LAFTA nation was obligated to
reduce its total tariff structure by a weighted average of 8% per
year7' through these National Schedule negotiations. Unable to
reach this 8% goal, the LAFTA nations in the Protocol of Cara-
cas reduced this obligation from 8% annually to 2.9% yearly.7"
As of 1964, more than 8,000 bilateral concessions7 3 had been
made. Few additional concessions have been concluded. Under
the Cartagena Agreement, an ANCOM nation must continue
to grant the lower duties conceded under a National Schedules
negotiation to all LAFTA members.7
Suppose, as in the above hypothetical, Venezuela did
69. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, art. 49.
70. Montevideo Treaty, supra note 29, art. 18.
71. Id. art. 5.
72. Protocol of Caracas Modifying the Treaty of Montevideo (Dec. 11, 1969), art.
6; [19701 Gaceta Legal No. 288, at 5 (Ven.). Note that Bolivia and Ecuador are
exempted from the strict application of these rules.
73. Note, supra note 31, at 151.
74. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, art. 114.
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agree with Brazil to reduce its duty on widget X under a
LAFTA National Schedules negotiation from 50% to 30%.
ANCOM now sets the minimum common external tariff on
widget X's at 75% and the final common external tariff at 85%.
Widget X's from Brazil, Mexico, and all other LAFTA nations
outside ANCOM will still enter Venezuela at 30%. On entry
into Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, or Bolivia, widget X's from
LAFTA nations outside ANCOM will have to pay the ANCOM
common external tariff rate (75% and later 85%). In other
words, Venezuela's duty of 30% will be an exception to the
general applicability of the ANCOM common external tariff.
In contrast, assume Venezuela had a duty rate of 80% on
widget Y ANCOM sets a minimum common external tariff of
110% on widget Y Venezuela will have to raise her duty on
widget Y from LAFTA nations outside ANCOM because the
prohibition in the LAFTA Agreement against increasing tariffs
has been interpreted to apply only to items on which a LAFTA
concession has been made. 5 Since Venezuela's duty of 80% on
widget Y was not the result of a LAFTA concession, Venezuela
would have to bring the tariff on this item up to the ANCOM
common external tariff level of 110%.
In all future trade negotiations with LAFTA and with
other world trade organizations, such as GATT, ANCOM must
negotiate as a unit."6 Thus, for example, Venezuela may no
longer on its own enter into tariff agreements with any outside
countries.
C. The Sectorial Programs
Had the members of ANCOM simply created a customs
union without more, new investments would have tended to
flow into the areas with the most highly developed infrastruc-
ture and the most sophisticated commercial foundation. Thus,
development throughout the region would have been uneven,
with the wealthier nations attracting increasing amounts of
investment, while the poorer nations lagged progressively fur-
ther behind in new capital formation. This vicious circle could
have prevented Bolivia and Ecuador from ever reaching the
takeoff point in the development process. Thus, the framers of
75. Ereli, The Andean Common Market, 8 Hous. L. REv. 487, 494 (1971).
76. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, art. 26(e).
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the Cartagena Agreement had to build in certain compensatory
mechanisms to ensure a more balanced development within
the region.
One technique, already discussed in Part II-A and 11-B,
was to grant Bolivia and Ecuador longer time periods in which
to reduce their internal and external tariffs to the prescribed
levels. Another was the establishment of the Andean Develop-
ment Corporation, capitalized at $25 million. Authorized to
provide financial and technical assistance, this organization is
charged with fostering "an equitable distribution of investment
in the region.""
Moreover, the potential gain from integration of a number
of small markets derives from the more rational allocation of
new investment on a multinational regional basis. Conse-
quently, the scale of new industries may be closer to optimal,
thereby reducing costs below what they would be in small na-
tional markets protected by tariffs.7" Duplicate production of
an item by different small manufacturers on a local level may
be viewed as inefficient. To maximize the gains from the im-
proved allocation of new investment, the ANCOM nations
have resorted to regional economic planning.
Finally, the planners of an integrated multinational econ-
omy must take steps to curb the natural tendency of their
individual member nations to compete with each other for new
industries through offering more attractive investment and tax
incentives. To restrict this particular form of competition, the
Cartegena Agreement provided that the member states should
harmonize their laws on industrial incentives.7 9 Although the
countries in ANCOM have not yet accomplished this objective,
they did recently agree to refrain from establishing any foreign
investment incentives more favorable than those currently ex-
isting.1s In addition, ANCOM has approved Decision 40 on the
Avoidance of Double Taxation.8'
77. Agreement Establishing the Andean Development Corporation, signed Feb. 7,
1968, arts. 3,4,5, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 940 (1969).
78. WALTER & VrrzTHuM, supra note 1, at 12 et seq.
79. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 7, art. 28, para. 2.
80. Temporary Provisions promulgated as Decision 103 and modified by Decision
109, amending Decision 24 of the Commission of the Cartegna Agreement, as amended
(Andean Foreign Investment Code) (Nov. 30, 1976), reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS
138, 155 (1977).
81. As cited in Furnish & Atkin, The Andean Group's Program for Industrial
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Nonetheless, the Sectorial Program for Industrial Develop-
ment is the most important mechanism established by
ANCOM to achieve a more equitable distribution of new in-
vestment and to ensure "rational specialization of produc-
tion. ' 8 Under the Sectorial Programs, production of various
goods is to be assigned either on an exclusive or a shared basis
to a particular nation or nations, hereinafter referred to as the
"favored" nation(s). Such assignments do not technically cre-
ate a monopoly since companies in nonfavored countries are
not prohibited from manufacturing the same item. However, a
preferential tariff structure is temporarily established to bene-
fit the favored nation(s) and certain applicable legal provisions
may limit or discourage the production of the same article in
the nonfavored nation(s).
In constructing a Sectorial Program, the ANCOM Com-
mission deals with an entire industrial segment, determines
what products are to be included therein,83 and assigns each of
these items to one or more favored nation(s). Special internal
duty structures and common external tariffs" are created for
every product in a particular Sectorial Program.
To date, two Sectorial Programs have been approved: (1)
the metalworking sector and (2) the petrochemical sector. An
analysis of the legal framework of these programs will reveal
how this multinational planning tool is intended to achieve the
desired allocation of industries.
1. The Metalworking Sector
In August 1972, the ANCOM Commission, by Decision 57,
adopted its first Sectorial Program for the metalworking indus-
try. Initially, 128 items in the NABANDINA classification list
had been reserved for this sector.85 Ultimately, however, only
seventy-two units were assigned under the program. The re-
maining items originally reserved for this Sectorial Program
but not actually assigned now fall into a different category, and
Development of the Metalworking Sector: Integration with Due and Deliberate SPID,
7 LAW. AM. 29, 36 & n.55 (1975).
82. Agreement Establishing the Andean Development Corporation, signed Feb. 7,
1968, art. 3, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 940 (1969).
83. Cartegena Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 47, 50.
84. Id. arts. 34(f), 45(b), 49.
85. Furnish & Atkin, supra note 81, at 42.
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internal duties on these must be gradually reduced to zero by
all members as set forth in Part II-A-2.
Forty-five units were assigned on an exclusive basis to in-
dividual nations. Bolivia and Eduador received twenty of these
exclusive assignments. The remaining units were assigned on
a shared basis to two or three nations. 6 Examples of products
included within these metalworking sector assignments include
drill bits, agricultural machines, mining equipment, genera-
tors, and clocks. 7
Once a nation has received an assignment, it must submit
to the ANCOM Board a feasibility study on the production of
the item within a stipulated time period-two years for Colom-
bia and Peru, s8 and three years for Bolivia and Ecuador. 8 Pro-
duction of the assigned items must begin within three years
after delivery of the feasibility study. In exceptional cases the
Board may extend this production startup deadline, but by no
more than one additional year for Colombia and Peru. 0
If the feasibility study shows that it is not practical to
manufacture an item, or if the favored nation(s) fails to meet
the production startup deadline, then the item shifts out of the
Sectorial Program and internal duties on it must be reduced as
described in Part H-A-2 above."
Within thirty days after Decision 57 was approved, all non-
tariff barriers (e.g., quotas) were to have been removed on the
assigned products. 2 Also on that date a discriminatory tariff
structure went into effect, thereby creating a preferential mar-
gin for the benefit of-the favored nations. For items from out-
side ANCOM, all members have to apply the common external
tariff rates for assigned products, starting on December 31st of
the year preceding the scheduled production startup date. 3
The operation of this preferential tariff structure can best
86. Id.
87. Id. at 43.
88. Decision 57 of Aug. 23, 1972, Annex A, arts. 4, 5.
89. Id. art. 6.
90. Id.
91. Id. art. 8.
92. Id. art. 14.
93. Id. art. 17. A member state may petition the Board for temporary relief from
the common external tariff when necessary to relieve a "deficiency in supplies." Carta-
gena Agreement, supra note 7, art. 67.
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be illustrated by a hypothetical case. (Venezuela has been
omitted from this example because she was not a member of
ANCOM when Decision 57 was approved; but for future ana-
lytical purposes Venezuela should be classified with Colombia
and Peru in thinking about Sectorial Programs.)
Assume that widget X was exclusively assigned to Bolivia,
that the common external tariff was set at 75%, and that
Bolivia has begun producing the item. Assume further that
prior to Decision 57, the duties on widget X were as follows:
Pre-Existing Rate
Bolivia 95%
Colombia 85%
Peru 25%
Ecuador 65%
Now let us explore what happens under Decision 57 when
widget X enters an ANCOM nation.
a. From Bolivia to Colombia or Peru? The rate would be
zero, because the nonfavored nations must immediately elimi-
nate all duties on assigned products from the favored nations.9
b. From Bolivia to Ecuador? Again the rate would be
zero. Although for many purposes Ecuador is accorded special
treatment as a poorer nation, Ecuador too must eliminate her
duty on assigned products from favored nations. 5
c. Colombian Widget X's entering Peru? A duty of 25%
would be imposed on the Colombian widget X's. Member na-
tions are to continue applying their existing duty rates on as-
signed products from nonfavored nations. However, after
1980, such duties must be eliminated on these products even
if they are manufactured in a nonfavored nation. 7
d. Peruvian Widget X's entering Colombia? The duty
would be 75%. The rule would have been the same as in "c"
above (i. e. 85%), except that Decision 57 prohibits any member
from applying a rate higher than the common external tariff,
94. Id. art. 10.
95. Id.
96. Id.; Furnish & Atkin, supra note 81, at 45.
97. Decision 57 of Aug. 23, 1972, Annex A, art. 10.
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i.e. 75%.98 Again this charge will have to be eliminated after
1980.11
e. Colombian Widget X's entering Ecuador? The duty
would be 65%. Ecuador may impose her existing tariff against
assigned items from nonfavored nations, but she too will have
to eliminate it after 1980.10
f. Colombian or Peruvian Widget X's entering Bolivia?
The duty would be 75% since no member can charge in excess
of the common external tariff rate. °10 As a favored nation for
this product, Bolivia will be able to apply this rate until 1985,
after which she may impose no duty on this item if it is pro-
duced in any ANCOM nation.02 The same result would follow
if the assignment had been made to Ecuador. However, if the
assignment had been made to Colombia or Peru, they would
have to cease applying duties to widget X's from ANCOM
nations by 1981.101
g. Widget X's from the United States to any ANCOM
Country? Widget X's are subject to the common external tariff
of 75% and that rate will continue to apply to these widgets
from outside the ANCOM region indefinitely.
h. Widget X's from Brazil into any ANCOM nation?
Normally, they would be subject to the 75% common external
tariff. However, as explained in Part II-B above, if any
ANCOM member has made a LAFTA concession on widget X,
that country must continue offering that lower duty rate to all
members of LAFTA, including the six LAFTA nations outside
of ANCOM.
Assuming the same preexisting duty rates postulated
above, what would be the situation if the assignment had been
made to both Bolivia and Ecuador? As indicated supra, Ecu-
adorean and Bolivian widget X's would enter Peru and Colom-
bia duty free. Likewise, widget X's from nonfavored ANCOM
nations would pay 25% on entry into Peru and 75% on entry
into Colombia. After 1980, they would be duty free.
98. Id. art. 13.
99. Id. art. 10.
100. Id.
101. Id. art. 13.
102. Id. art. 11.
103. Id.
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What about widget X's entering Bolivia or Ecuador? Deci-
sion 57 requires that where a shared allocation has been made,
the lowest preexisting duty rate among the favored nations be
the rate applied by all those favored nations to that item.0 4
Since Ecuador's duty was 65% and Bolivia's 95%, both Ecua-
dor and Bolivia may now impose only a 65% duty on widget X's
from any ANCOM nation. Moreover, three years after produc-
tion has begun in any one of the favored nations, they too must
eliminate duties on that item. Thus, if Ecuador began produc-
ing widget X in 1978, both Bolivia and Ecuador would have to
reduce their duty for widget X's from other ANCOM nations
by 40% in 1979, by an additional 30% in 1980, and a final 30%
in 1981.105 By 1982, all widget X's from ANCOM countries
would circulate throughout the region duty free.
It should be noted from the above analysis that if an item
has been assigned exclusively to Colombia or to Peru, it will
circulate throughout the region duty free after 1980, even if it
is manufactured in a nonfavored nation. If widget X is assigned
exclusively to Bolivia or Ecuador, then widget X's from the
favored nation (Bolivia or Ecuador) will have to compete
equally after 1980 with widget X's from nonfavored nations in
ANCOM countries, except in the countries which received the
assignment. The favored nation (Bolivia or Ecuador) may con-
tinue protecting its own infant industry in this widget X a few
years longer by maintaining its own tariffs against widget X's
from other ANCOM nations until 1985.
If widget X is assigned to two or more countries, widget X
from those favored nations must compete equally in nonfa-
vored nation markets with widget X's produced in nonfavored
nations after 1980. The favored nations, however, may apply
duties to protect their own industry against widget X's from
nonfavored countries until three years after production of the
widget has begun in one of the favored nations. Upon expira-
tion of that three years, widget X's will circulate duty free
through the entire region.
The above analysis shows that the Metalworking Sectorial
Program should not be described as a "monopoly." Competing
104. Id. art. 12(a).
105. Id. art. 12(b).
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firms in nonfavored nations may still produce the product.
Within their home-nation market, they would be selling on an
equal basis with companies from the favored nation(s), al-
though economies of scale could theoretically give the favored-
nation producer certain cost advantages. Moreover, the manu-
facturer in the nonfavored nation may even be able to sell the
item in other ANCOM nations, if his efficiency is such that he
can absorb the cost differential of the tariff from which the
favored-nation competitor is relieved. Finally, all these dis-
criminatory tariffs are scheduled to disappear within a few
years.
Member countries are obligated to refrain from encourag-
ing competing projects in nonfavored nations. They may not
render assistance of a positive nature, such as government
loans, tax benefits, or investment incentives, to new projects
to produce such items. 06 (Preexisting obligations of a member
government may still be respected.) Likewise, a nonfavored
nation may not authorize new direct foreign investment to
manufacture the assigned item. 107 Both the foregoing prohi-
bitions will cease after 1982 for items assigned to Colombia
or Peru and after 1987 for goods assigned to Bolivia or Ecua-
dor.' "' An existing foreign owned producer of the item is free
to continue producing it in nonfavored countries, and there is
nothing in the law to prevent a locally owned company from
starting up a new project to manufacture this item in a non-
favored nation.
Since Decision 57 was promulgated prior to Venezuela's
joining ANCOM, considerable difficulty was encountered in
meshing this country into that preexisting scheme. The Acces-
sion Treaty did provide that a revised Metalworking Sectorial
Program would be developed to include Venezuela.0 9 Mean-
while, Venezuela was relieved of any obligation to permit duty
free entry of the assigned products from the favored nations."0
Also during the interim period, Venezuela promised to refrain
from encouraging production in its territory of the assigned
items."'
106. Id. art. 24.
107. Id.
108. Id. art. 26.
109. Accession Agreement, supra note 25, art. 27.
110. Id. art. 29.
111. Id.
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The withdrawal of Chile from ANCOM provided an op-
portunity to solve this problem. Products which had previously
been assigned to Chile were reallocated to other ANCOM
members and thirty of the reassigned items went to Venezuela.
This included products such as harvesters, railroad equipment,
and fuel pumps. The final draft of this revised Metalworking
Sectorial Program was completed"2 at the end of 1977.
The most widely publicized dispute arising under the Met-
alworking Sectorial Program involves an investment by Dresser
Industries in Cia. Andina de Tricones (CATSA), a Bolivian
joint venture, to produce tricone drill bits. These bits had been
exclusively assigned to Bolivia. However, after two years,
CATSA found itself unable to export these bits to other
ANCOM nations and was forced to shut down.
It has been alleged that this failure was due to other
ANCOM members not honoring their obligations. However, an
analysis of the applicable laws may lead to a different conclu-
sion. First, the ANCOM common external-tariff for tricone drill
bits had been set at 55%, but some of the ANCOM nations had
previously granted LAFTA concessions on tricone drill bits.
Thus the 55% rate was not applied on the bits when they en-
tered those countries. This permitted long established manu-
facturers in Brazil and Argentina to sell their bits in those
ANCOM states more cheaply than the new Bolivian com-
pany."3 Such result though merely represents compliance with
the law, since the ANCOM nations are still bound by their
LAFTA obligations.
In addition, new plants producing tricone drill bits were
reportedly established in Venezuela and Peru."' Decision 57
does prohibit direct foreign investment in the nonfavored na-
tions, but, as to local manufacturers, the government is only
obligated to refrain from encouraging them. Hence, the facts
as reported do not seem to provide any basis for a claim of
illegality.
112. Ancom 's Revisions of Metalworking Sectorial Are Upbeat Sign for Pact, 1977
Bus. LATIN AMERICA 398.
113. The Pullout of Dresser from Bolivian Operation Shows Problems of Ancom,
1977 Bus. LATIN AMERICA 57.
114. Id.
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2. The Petrochemical Sectorial Program
On August 29, 1975, ANCOM approved Decision 91 on the
Petrochemical Sectorial Program," 5 covering more than 150
products."8 Some fifty were assigned to member states, most
on a shared basis."7 Of these Venezuela received twenty-four
items, including carbon black, chlorofluoromethanes, and
PVC.11s On an exclusive basis, she was allocated methanol,
epoxy resins, and toluene diisocynates."9
The internal tariff structure of the Petrochemical Sectorial
Program parallels that of the Metalworking Sectorial Program,
except for the following modifications. Against assigned prod-
ucts from nonfavored nations, the members will apply the com-
mon external tariff rate instead of their individual preexisting
rates. 2 Likewise, the favored nations will apply the common
external tariff rate to protect their own assigned products until
1985 in the case of Bolivia and Ecuador and until 1980 for the
other three countries. 2 ' Of course, any lower rates established
under LAFTA concessions would still be applicable.
Where an assignment is shared by more than one nation,
those favored countries will apply to the assigned items from
nonfavored nations the rates stipulated in Annex IV of Decision
91.'2 On some items, such rates are higher for Bolivia and
Ecuador than for the remaining members. The protective tar-
iffs maintained by the favored nations must be removed after
1985 in Bolivia and Ecuador and after 1980 in the remaining
states. 123
The products previously reserved for this sector but not
115. Reprinted in [19761 Gaceta Legal No. 428, at 2 (Ven.). See also Molins,
Andean Common Market, The Sectorial Program for the Development of the Petro-
chemical Industry, in BUSINESS AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF LATIN AMERICAN TRADE AND
INVESTMENT 85 (D. Shea & F. Swacker eds. 1976).
116. Id. Annex I, at 6.
117. Ancom Approves Petrochemical Program; Auto Allocations Set, 1975 Bus.
LATIN AMERICA 297.
118. Decision 91 of August 29, 1975, Annex II, reprinted in [1976] Gaceta Legal
No. 428, at 2 (Ven.).
119. MNCs, Ancom Programs Are Slotted Into Venezuela's Auto and Petrochemi-
cal Plans, 1975 Bus. LATIN AMERICA 390.
120. Decision 91, supra note 118, art. 12.
121. Id. art. 13.
122. Id. art. 14(a).
123. Id. art. 14(b).
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actually assigned under Decision 91, were divided into two cat-
egories. The first group, consisting mostly of goods not pro-
duced in the region become duty free through the common
market almost immediately.'24 The second group of products
will eventually be duty free throughout the market. Those en-
tering into Bolivia or Ecuador from the other ANCOM nations
will be subjected to duties which will progressively decline
until they reach zero after 1985.125 Those items originating in
Bolivia or Ecuador will enter the other three nations duty free
today.2 As to such products manufactured in Colombia, Peru,
or Venezuela, duties may be applied on the entry of such items
into any one of these three nations; such tariffs must be pro-
gressively reduced to zero by the end of 1980. '27
The Petrochemical Sectorial law also prohibits nonfavored
nations from encouraging new investment in assigned items'28
and forbids approval by nonfavored nations of new direct for-
eign investment in such products. '29 In addition, this Decision
prohibits contracts for technology transfers from foreign com-
panies to produce the assigned items in nonfavored nations.'30
One of the prime goals of Venezuela has been the creation
of a major petrochemical export industry by the mid-1980s. In
1975, the Venezuelan National Petrochemical Council was es-
tablished to undertake the economic planning necessary to
achieve this goal.13' Consequently, it was vital to this nation
that the allocations made under the Sectorial Program not de-
prive her of the possibility of building a strong petrochemical
industry oriented toward exports to the outside world. Hence
she bargained for and obtained a crucial exception to the gen-
eral rules of the Sectorial Program.
That exception provides that the prohibition against non-
favored nations stimulating investments in the assigned items
124. Id. art. 15 (a).
125. Id. art. 15(b)(iii).
126. Id. art. 15(b)(ii).
127. Id. art. 15(b)(i).
128. Id. art. 26.
129. Id. art. 27.
130. Id.
131. Decree 707 of Jan. 14, 1975, [1975] Gaceta Legal No. 387, at 2 (Ven.).
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will not apply, if all the production of such goods is exported
outside the common market. Likewise, the prohibition against
foreign direct investment and foreign technology transfer con-
tracts will be inapplicable in this situation.'32 Some additional
conditions must be satisfied to avoid those prohibitions. All the
raw materials for such excepted projects must come from
within the ANCOM region, unless there are insufficient sup-
plies therein.'3 Also, the authorization of an excepted project
must not have a prejudicial effect on other ANCOM nations,
especially the country to whom the product has been as-
signed.'3 ' Finally, the interested government must conclude a
contract with the excepted firm ensuring compliance with the
foregoing conditions. 35 In the event of shortages of the item
concerned, the ANCOM Board may authorize the sale of such
products from the excepted company inside the common mar-
ket, subject to a duty rate equivalent to the common external
tariff. If the product is sold inside the nation where the ex-
cepted company is located, such country shall impose an inter-
nal charge equivalent to the common external tariff. The Board
may authorize a reduction in or suspension of these internal
duties or charges. 3 '
Decision 91 also provides that where an assignment is
shared with either Bolivia or Ecuador, an agreement must be
concluded with or steps taken by the other favored nation to
"ensure equitable participation" in the market by Bolivia or
Ecuador. 37 Pursuant to this provision, Venezuela, which shares
an assignment of high density polyethylenes with Bolivia,' 38
agreed to yield this market to Bolivia until 1991. As soon as
Bolivia begins producing this chemical, Venezuela will direct
all of its sales thereof to nations outside ANCOM. 39
3. Other Sectorial Programs
By the end of 1977, ANCOM had negotiated the terms of
an agreement on the Automotive Sector. Under this proposal,
132. Decision 91, supra note 118, art. 41(b).
133. Id. art. 41(c).
134. Id. art. 41(a).
135. Id. art. 41(d).
136. Id. art. 44.
137. Id. art. 36.
138. Id., Annex II.
139. Ancom Approves Petrochemical Program; Auto Allocations Set, 1975 Bus.
LATIN AMERICA 297.
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Bolivia and Ecuador would have duty free access to the mar-
kets of the other three nations by 1983 for these products. Such
items will be traded duty free between Venezuela, Colombia,
and Peru by 1983. Bolivia and Ecuador would have to institute
progressive duty cuts on these products beginning in 1983 to
achieve a zero rate by 1989.
To qualify for the preferential tariff treatment, strict local
content rules will have to be satisfied. At present, the local
content of the three producing nations averages about 35%.
Under the proposed program, Venezuela would have to reach
a local content level of 75% by 1980.140
A key element of this program is the emphasis placed on
coproduction of automobiles rather than on individual alloca-
tions of items. For example, Ecuador and Venezuela have
made an agreement under which Ecuador will produce compo-
nents for cars manufactured in Venezuela. 41
The common external tariffs have been agreed upon. They
average around 50% for component parts and range from 40%
to 155% for chassis and finished vehicles. These common exter-
nal tariffs are provisional and are to be reviewed in two years. 4 1
Negotiations are currently pending on a sectorial program
for the fertilizer industry. The planners hope to achieve an
internal duty structure which will promote fertilizer production
on a region-wide basis. 4 1
D. Control of Foreign Investment
One of the most important legislative acts of the Andean
Common Market was the promulgation of Decision 24 in
1970,14 hereinafter referred to as the Andean Foreign Invest-
140. Ancom Sets Final Terms on Sectorial Program for Automotive Industry, 1977
Bus. LATIN AMERICA 327; Decree 921 of May 16, 1975, [1975] Gaceta Legal No. 394,
at 27 (Ven.). See also Regulations for the Development of the Automotive Industry
(Ven. Ministry of Development, Aug. 28, 1975), [1975] Gaceta Legal No. 402, at 20
(Ven.).
141. Ancom Automotive Program Is Ready for Signing With Something for All,
1977 Bus. LATIN AMERICA 286.
142. Note 140 supra.
143. Recent Fertilizer Seminar May Serve To Bolster Ancom 's Sectorial Program,
1977 Bus. LATIN AMERICA 271.
144. Decision 24 of the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, Common Re-
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ment Code. This law governs direct foreign investment, foreign
private loans, and technology transfers from abroad. The Code
establishes a minimum level of restrictions which each member
state must impose on these foreign inputs; however, the indi-
vidual nations remain free to impose other limitations in addi-
tion to those stipulated in the Code.
On joining the common market, Venezuela had little diffi-
culty in accepting the philosophy underlying this Code. As
early as 1971-two years before she joined ANCOM-the Vene-
zuelan government had proposed national legislation which
incorporated many of the basic concepts of the Code."' As part
of her adhesion to ANCOM, she adopted the Code and shortly
thereafter enacted Decree 62146 and Decree 631"1 to implement
the Code. Recently, she replaced Decree 62 with Decree 2,03111
and Decree 63 with Decree 2,44211 to bring her domestic law
into conformity with the 1976 amendments to the Andean For-
eign Investment Code.15°
Both the Code and Venezuela's internal laws require all
new and existing foreign investments to be registered with and
approved by the government. 5' Loans from foreign sources to
companies in Venezuela must also receive prior governmental
authorization.'52 All contracts to import technology, as well as
those to use patents or trademarks, must likewise be approved
and registered.'5 Failure to comply with these registration re-
quirements will result in the loss of the right to remit earnings'54
gime of Treatment of Foreign Capital and of Trademarks, Patents, Licenses, and
Royalties, as amended (1976), reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 138 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as AFIC]. See also note 25 supra.
145. Venezuela's Proposed Investment Law Shows Influence of Ancom's
Regulations, 1972 Bus. LATIN AMERICA 71.
146. Apr. 28, 1974, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1220 (1974).
147. Apr. 28, 1974, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1221 (1974).
148. Feb. 8, 1977, reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT'IS 1531 (1977) and in Gac. Of.
31,171 (Feb. 9, 1977) (Ven.).
149. Nov. 8, 1977, Gac. Of. 2,100 Ex. (Nov. 15, 1977) (Ven.).
150. See Decision 103 of Oct. 30, 1976 and Decision 109 of Nov. 30, 1976, inte-
grated into Decision 24 reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 138 (1977).
151. AFIC, supra note 144, arts. 2, 5; Ven. Decree 2442 supra note 149, arts. 13,
20.
152. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 14; Ven. Decree 2442, supra note 149., art. 55.
153. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 18; Ven. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 63.
154. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 37; Ven. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 32.
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or capital,' 5 to make payments on principal or interest,'6 as
well as to transfer royalties abroad.' 7
The agency in Venezuela charged with supervising these
foreign inputs is SIEX (the Foreign Investment Agency), re-
sponsible to the Ministry of Finance.' 5 SIEX must decide
whether to approve a direct foreign investment within 180 days
after filing of the completed application.'59
Inspired by Professor Hirschman's thesis that foreign com-
panies should gradually begin divesting themselves of equity
investments in Latin America,' 0 the decisionmakers of
ANCOM built into the Andean Foreign Investment Code pro-
visions to compel periodic sales of foreign held shares to nation-
als within the member states. Since an extensive literature
already exists on these fadeout provisions,'6 ' this article will
focus only on Venezuela's laws implementing the Code and the
recent amendments thereto.
1. The Divestment Provisions
All foreign enterprises'6 2 making new investments in Vene-
155. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 8; Ven. Decree 2442, supra note 149, arts. 41, 42.
156. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 16; Ven. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 62.
157. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 21; Ven. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 64, sole
para.
158. Ven. Decree 2442, supra note 149, arts. 3-12.
159. Id. art. 26. For appeal from an adverse decision by SIEX, see id. arts. 74-77.
160. A. HIRSCHMAN, HOW TO DIVEST IN LATIN AMERICA AND WHY (1969).
161. Abbott, Bargaining Power and Strategy in the Foreign Investment Process:
A Current Andean Code Analysis, 3 SYR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 319 (1975); Danino, The
Andean Code After Five Years, 8 LAW. AM. 635 (1976); Fouts, The Andean Foreign
Investment Code, 10 TEX. INT'L L.J. 537 (1975); Oliver, The Andean Foreign Invest-
ment Code: A New Phase in the Quest for Normative Order as to Direct Foreign
Investment, 66 AM. J. INT'LL. 763 (1972); Schill, The Mexican and Andean Investment
Codes: An Overview and Comparison, 6 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 437 (1974); Schliesser
(ed.), Recent Developments in Latin-American Foreign Investment Laws, 6 INT'L LAW.
64 (1972); Valdez, The Andean Foreign Investment Code: An Analysis, 7 J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 1 (1972); Comment, Chile's Rejection of the Andean Common Market Regula-
tion of Foreign Investment, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 138 (1977); Note, Andean Pact
Constitutionality: A Final Word from Colombia, 7 LAW. AM. 614 (1975); Note, The
Multinational Enterprise in the Context of Latin American Economic Integration: The
Andean Agreement Model, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 245 (1973); Note, Political Compo-
nents and Practical Effects of the Andean Foreign Investment Code, 27 STAN. L. REV.
1597 (1975).
162. Foreign investment is defined in article 1 of the AFIC, supra note 144, and
articles 2(a) and (b) of Decree 2442, supra note 149.
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zuela after December 31, 1974, must agree to transform them-
selves into "mixed" or "national" companies within a time
period not to exceed fifteen years." 3 The expansion of an exist-
ing investment is treated as "new" for this purpose."'
A mixed enterprise is one in which foreign investors hold
less than 50% of the stock."5 A firm in which foreigners own less
than 20% of the shares is a "national" company. 6' A citizen of
any ANCOM member state may be treated as a national when
computing these percentages.167 For example, a Peruvian share-
holder in a Venezuelan company would be considered
"Venezuelan." However, where required by the law of his home
nation, a subregional investor must receive the consent of his
own government to make such an investment.'
Under these transformation agreements, at least 15% of
the shares must be held by Venezuelans (or other subregional
investors) at the time production begins. National investors
must own 30% of the stock by the time that one-third of the
stipulated time period has passed; upon expiration of two-
thirds of this time period, 45% of the stock must be in the
hands of local persons. At the end of not more than fifteen
years, at least 51% of the total shares must be owned by Vene-
zuelans or nationals from other ANCOM states.6 9 Where
shares are sold publicly on the stock market, foreign investors
may sell their shares to other foreign investors, but such trans-
fers must be registered with SIEX.170
Subject to the exceptions described below, foreign owned
companies existing in Venezuela prior to January 1, 1974, do
not have to satisfy these divestment requirements. However, if
such preexisting companies wish to receive the benefits of the
163. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 30; Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 51.
164. AFIC supra note 144, art. 1; Decree 2442, supra note 149, arts. 2(a), (b).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 1; Decree 2442, supra note 149, arts. 2(c), 27.
168. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 1; Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 28.
169. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 30; Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 51; see Ley
Sobre Transformaciones de Empresas Extranjeras (May 21, 1975), Gac. Of. 30774
(Aug. 21, 1975) as printed in G. PICO MANTILLA, supra note 25, at 349, translated and
reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1489 (1975).
170. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 25.
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reduced internal tariffs upon shipping their products to other
ANCOM nations, they too must agree to transform themselves
into national or mixed companies by 1989.''
The Andean Foreign Investment Code provides for some
major exceptions to these divestment requirements. Article 34
of the Code exempts foreign enterprises which export more
than 80% of their production outside the ANCOM region; such
firms, however, would not qualify for the reduced internal tar-
iffs when they sell to other ANCOM nations. This Article also
exempts investments in the tourism sector from the fadeout
provisions. Article 36 of the Code stipulates that a company
shall be considered as "mixed," if the state owns a portion of
its shares, even if that percentage be less than 51%, so long as
the state has a "determining capacity" in the decisions of the
enterprise. Finally, the recent ANCOM Decision 124 provides
that investments by public international lending institutions
(e.g., the World Bank) or by foreign government development
assistance programs shall be treated as "neutral" capital and
excluded in computing the percentages required to qualify as
a "mixed" or "national" company.'72
It is not clear whether the provisions of Articles 34 and 36
of the Andean Foreign Investment Code and ANCOM Decision
124 are effective law in Venezuela. Neither Venezuelan Decree
2,031 nor Decree 2,442 mentions such exceptions. It may be
that the Venezuelan decisionmakers concluded their economy
was strong enough to attract foreign investments without these
special exemptions. On the other hand, one might argue that
these exceptions are incorporated by reference into this na-
tion's domestic law since the congressional decree approving
Venezuela's accession to ANCOM specifically included Deci-
sion 24, the Andean Foreign Investment Code. Moreover, arti-
cle 1 of Venezuela's Decree No. 2,442 states that Decision 24
and the recent amendment thereto, Decision 103, shall govern
foreign investments.
The Andean Foreign Investment Code also provides that
the fadeout provisions do not have to be applied to the basic
171. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 28; Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 49.
172. Art. 2(c); See AFIC, supra note 144, at 155 (temporary provisions).
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products sector for a period of ten years.' The term "basic
products ' refers primarily to oil and gas, minerals, and pipe-
lines. Since Venezuela has already nationalized her petroleum
and iron ore industries,'74 that provision of the Code probably
has little significance for this nation.
Certain sectors of the economy are reserved for "national"
companies only. Included in this category are all public serv-
ices, "5 a term defined in Venezuelan legislation to include tele-
phones, mail, telecommunications, drinking water, electricity,
sewage works, sanitary services, street cleaning, and garbage
collection, as well as security services.'78
New investments in insurance and commercial banking
are limited to national companies. Existing banks in Venezuela
must convert to national companies or lose the right to accept
local deposits'77 or to increase their capital.7 ' No branches of
foreign banks may be established in Venezuela after 1975.' 71
Insurance companies may not operate in this nation if more
than 20% of their shares are held by foreigners; 80 existing insur-
ance companies were given two years in which to convert into
national companies.' 8 '
New investments are also restricted to national companies
for the following industries: domestic transportation services,
advertising, television, and newspapers and magazines in
173. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 40.
174. Ley Organica Que Reserva al Estado la Industria and el Comercio de los
Hidrocarboros (August 29, 1975), [1975] Gaceta Legal.No. 405, at 5 (Ven.); Decree
580, Por El Cual Se Reserva al Estado La Industria De La Explotacion De Mineral
De Hierro (November 26, 1974), [1974] Gaceta Legal No. 384, at 5 (Ven.).
175. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 41; Ven. Decree 2031, supra note 148, art. 1(a).
176. Decree 2031, supra note 148, art. 1(a).
177. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 42; Ley General de Bancos y Otros Instituciones
de Credito, Decree 869 of Apr. 22, 1975, arts. 95, 98, [1975] Gaceta Legal No. 394, at
3 (Ven.); Ven. Decree 2031, supra note 148, art. 4.
178. Ley General de Bancos y Otros Instituciones de Credito, Decree 869 of Apr.
22, 1975, art. 97, [1975] Gaceta Legal No. 394, at 3 (Ven.).
179. Id. art. 96.
180. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 42, and Ley de Empresas de Seguros y Reaseguros,
Decree 870 of Apr. 22, 1975, art. 25(b), [19751 Gaceta Legal No. 400, at 3 (Ven.).
181. Id. art. 192(a). Companies affected by this law were Pan American Life
VOL. 7:151
VENEZUELA AND ANCOM
Spanish. 82 Existing foreign enterprises operating in these fields
were to have been transformed into national enterprises by
December 30, 1977.' 3
The Andean Foreign Investment Code, however, does per-
mit a member state to waive the requirements that certain
economic sectors be reserved for national companies,' 8 ' but,
unless the firms operating in these fields qualify as either
"mixed" or "national," they will be denied the privilege of
selling to other ANCOM nations at the reduced internal duty
rates. 8 5 Venezuelan law authorizes SIEX to approve mergers or
sales which will result in a mixed company, even in those sec-
tors which are reserved for national companies.' This excep-
tion allows SIEX to aid in reducing the financial loss which
would otherwise be incurred by foreign enterprises forced to sell
the bulk of their shares to local investors within a very short
time period, e.g., by the end of 1977 for advertising firms.
Venezuela also reserves professional consulting for
"national" firms;8 7 this restriction is not required by the An-
dean Foreign Investment Code. Mixed companies in Vene-
zuela, nevertheless, may engage in professional consulting if
SIEX finds their work is "contributing technology" for the de-
velopment of the country. 88
Finally, the Andean Code reserves domestic marketing
services for national companies, 9 but allows its member states
to make exceptions to this rule in special circumstances. 90 Ven-
ezuelan law stipulated that firms engaged in marketing goods
shall convert into national firms by December 30, 1977.91 To
accomplish this, such companies could either sell existing
Insurance Co., American International Underwriter's Corp., AFIA World Ins., and
Confederated Life of Canada. IL&T, Venezuela § 3.03, at 6-7 (July 1977).
182. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 43; Decree 2031, supra note 148, art. l(b).
183. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 43; Decree 2031, supra note 148, arts. 2, 3.
184. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 44.
185. Id.
186. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 52.
187. Decree 2031, supra note 148, art. 1(d).
188. Id.
189. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 43.
190. Id. art. 44.
191. Decree 62, supra note 146, art. 2; Decree 2031, supra note 148, art. 2.
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shares or increase their capital. Many foreign firms encoun-
tered difficulty finding buyers for their shares. Other foreign
companies found purchasers, but among the traditional in-
dustrial groups. The government refused to approve those sales
because it wanted stock ownership to be more widely distrib-
uted among smaller investors. "' Thus, the new law provides
that SIEX may extend the 1977 deadline for an additional year
where justified by special circumstances. "3
The new Venezuelan statute on marketing refers only to
"goods.""' Consequently, firms marketing services, such as
leasing IBM machines or renting AVIS autos, are not obligated
to convert to national companies."'
There are several other important exceptions to the trans-
formation requirements for marketing concerns. First, compa-
nies which market goods they themselves have manufactured
within Venezuela are exempted from this obligation." ' A com-
pany will qualify for this classification if the locally manufac-
tured articles account for 51% of its total activities and if the
value added to the product within Venezuela amounts to at
least 30%. These percentages must be proportionately reflected
in the firm's gross sales and its total income. Furthermore,
other items marketed by these excepted companies must bear
a relation to the articles made locally." 7 Marketing companies
which before the end of 1977 have agreed with the government
to begin such local production by February 8, 1980, will also be
exempt from the transformation requirement."18
Another exception is made for existing concerns that mar-
ket goods produced under subcontracts with local firms. The
only requisite is that the excepted company provide, either
directly or through an affiliate, real and effective technology to
the local subcontractor. Such arrangements must be approved
192. New Venezuelan Decree Shows Changes in Attitude Toward Foreign
Investors, 1977 Bus. LATIN AMERICA 75, 79.
193. Decree 2031, supra note 148, art. 2.
194. Id. art. 1(c).
195. Venezuelan Decree On Marketing Operation Is Being Clarified, 1977 Bus.
LATIN AMERICA 126, 127.
196. Decree 2031, supra note 148, art. 1(c).
197. Id. art. 1, par. 3.
198. Id. art. 1, par. 2.
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by SIEX. 99 It has been reported that, upon expiration of the
relevant technology agreement, SIEX will not compel the ex-
empted firm to convert into a national company. °°
A final exception is provided for firms importing capital
equipment and consumer durables (as well as their accessory
and complementary parts), providing that such goods are not
produced in Venezuela and are not subject to import restric-
tions. To qualify for this exemption, the company must furnish
inside the nation the services needed to use and to maintain
these goods. Such firms are also obligated to train Venezuelan
nationals to perform this work."0'
It is not clear whether the above described excepted firms
in the marketing field are required to convert into mixed com-
panies. Decree 2,031 is silent on this question; however, the
general provisions of Decree 2,442 may be interpreted to require
their eventual transformation into mixed enterprises, at least
for new investments and for existing companies that wish to
sell to other ANCOM countries at the reduced internal duty
rates. 2
02
One final prohibition on foreign investors should be noted.
Venezuela and the four remaining nations may not authorize
direct foreign investment to produce goods which have been
reserved for manufacture by Ecuador or Bolivia (see Part II-A-
3 supra). ' 3
Several administrative provisions had to be built into the
laws, if the divestment requirements were to be effectively en-
forced. First, the Andean Foreign Investment Code stipulates
that all bearer shares must be converted into shares registered
in the name of the owner.241 This mandate was implemented in
Venezuela in 1975,205 and no bearer shares may be issued in the
future.206 Next, the Venezuelan legislation compels all enter-
199. Id. art. 1, par. 4.
200. Venezuelan Decree On Marketing Operations Is Being Clarified, 1977 Bus.
LATIN AMERICA 126.
201. Decree 2031, supra note 148, art. 1, para. 1.
202. Decree 2442, supra note 149, arts. 49, 51, 52.
203. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 46.
204. Id. art. 45.
205. SIEX, Aviso Oficial of Feb. 3, 1975, Acciones Nominativas, reprinted in G.
PIco MANTmLO, supra note 25, at 335.
206. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 79.
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prises with any foreign shareholders to obtain from SIEX cer-
tificates' 7 which indicate the category in which the company
falls-national, mixed, or foreign. 08 Finally, both the Andean
Foreign Investment Code'0 and the Venezuelan law '10 provide
for a system of certificates of origin to be issued to firms which
have agreed to transform themselves into national or mixed
companies and which are therefore entitled to sell to other
ANCOM nations at the reduced internal duty rates.
2. Controls over Earnings
Originally, the Andean Foreign Investment Code prohib-
ited foreign investors from remitting abroad yearly profits in
excess of an amount equal to 14% of the investment.2 1' Excep-
tions to this rule could be authorized only by the ANCOM
Commission.2 12 Likewise, member states could not authorize
foreign investors to reinvest annually profits in excess of the
equivalent of 5% of the company's capital. 213 Questions arose
as to what was to be done with any profits over these ceilings.
On accession to ANCOM, Venezuela did secure the right to
permit foreign investors to apply these limbo profits to Portfo-
lio Development Bonds, 21 which includes public debt certifi-
cates, mortage bonds, financial bonds, certificates of deposit,
private company bonds, and bonds or securities of the Andean
Development Corporation. 215
Foreign investors were quick to complain that these ceil-
ings on profits were too restrictive, especially in the case of
Venezuela. In 1973, just prior to Venezuela's accession to the
common market, that nation had been considered the most
profitable investment site in Latin America, with an average
return of 25.8%. At that time U.S. direct investment in Vene-
207. Id. arts. 44, 45.
208. "Foreign" is defined as an enterprise with 50% or more foreign ownership.
AFIC, supra note 144, art. 1.
209. Id. arts. 29, 32.
210. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 53.
211. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 37.
212. Id.
213. Id. art. 13.
214. Accession Agreement, supra note 25, Annex B, art. 34; AFIC, supra note 144,
art. 13.
215. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 36.
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zuela was $2.6 billion;'" two years later it had dropped to $2.1
billion. Likewise, the rate of return on investments had fallen
to 17.1%. 117 In 1976, only $51 million new foreign investment in
Venezuela was approved."'
The Venezuelan government was not unsympathetic to
these complaints from the foreign private sector. Even when
negotiating her entry into ANCOM, Venezuela had favored
increasing the ceiling on remittances to 20%.111 Finally, in 1976,
the Andean Foreign Investment Code and the Venezuelan law
were revised to liberalize the provisions on earnings of foreign
investors.
The ceiling on remittances abroad was increased from 14%
to 20% of the investment. 20 Moreover, the President of Vene-
zuela may authorize remittances in excess of that amount. 2 '
Venezuela's currency is freely convertible.222 Therefore, to
make these prohibitions effective, her law also had to forbid
distributions to foreign shareholders above the 20% ceiling.
However, distributions above that amount may be made to a
majority foreign-owned company, if it is incorporated in Vene-
zuela and if the distributed funds will not be sent abroad.22 3 In
addition, SIEX may permit distributions above the 20% for
approved investments or reinvestments in the nation.224 Fi-
nally, distributions above 20% are allowed if the President has
authorized remittances abroad in excess of that ceiling.225
For profits in excess of the amount permissible for distri-
bution to a foreign shareholder, SIEX may authorize such
funds to be declared as a dividend for the benefit of said share-
holder and to be used in one of the following ways. First, the
216. LA Investment and ROI Prospects Turn Favorable for US Firms, 1974 Bus.
LATIN AMERICA 370, 371.
217. US Direct Investment in LA And Rates of Return Doing Better Than
Elsewhere, 1976 Bus. LATIN AMERICA 321, 322.
218. IL&T, Venezuela § 1.06, at 4 (July 1977) (unofficial figures).
219. Venezuela Seeks Major Concession in Ancom Bid, 1972 Bus. LATIN AMERICA
101.
220. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 37; Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 33.
221. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 33.
222. IL&T, Venezuela § 1.04, at 3 (July 1977).
223. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 32.
224. Id. art. 34(1).
225. Id. art. 34(2).
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company may utilize these excess profits in the normal opera-
tions of the firm. Such funds are to be treated as a loan from
the foreign shareholder to that company and will earn interest
at the rate set by the Central Bank. Alternatively, such excess
profits may be placed in a trust fund for the benefit of the
foreign shareholder and receive the earnings therefrom. As a
third option, the monies may be invested in the Portfolio De-
velopment Bonds." 6 The earnings on amounts invested in any
of these three alternatives may be remitted abroad, and the
principle amount may be remitted upon liquidation of the com-
pany or sale of the shares, bonds, or rights.? 7
The ceiling on the amount of profit which the foreign
investor has an automatic right to reinvest was increased from
5% to 7%. While permission is not necessary for amounts under
that ceiling, such reinvestments must be registered with
SIEX.2 8 Such profits are classified as "reinvestments" and
may be added to the capital base upon which the 20% remitt-
ance and 7% reinvestment limits are computed in the future.2 9
Reinvestments above that 7% figure are treated as new invest-
ments and must receive prior approval by SIEX before they
can be added to that base.230 Foreign enterprises which have
signed agreements with the government to convert into na-
tional or mixed companies can reinvest profits above the 7%
ceiling without special permission of SIEX.? 1
3. Loans from Foreign Sources
Both the Andean Foreign Investment Code2 32 and the Ven-
ezuelan legislation2 33 provide that, for foreign source loans be-
tween related companies, the effective rate of interest may not
exceed three points above the market rate for first class securi-
ties in the country of origin of the funds. This prohibition ap-
plies to loans between a foreign parent and its subsidiary, as
226. Id. art. 35.
227. Id. arts. 35, 41.
228. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 13; Decree 2442, supra note 149, arts. 29, 30.
229. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 13; see Valdez, supra note 161, at 12; IL&T,
Venezuela 10 (March 1976).
230. Id.
231. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 31.
232. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 16.
233. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 58.
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well as between subsidiaries and/or affiliates of a foreign com-
pany."' The "effective" rate of interest includes commissions
and surcharges of all sorts."5 For foreign source loans between
unrelated companies, SIEX must establish the maximum
effective annual interest rate after consultation with the Cen-
tral Bank.2 36 In addition, Venezuelan law requires that all such
foreign loan contracts contain a clause permitting prepayment
free of penalties. 37
The Andean Foreign Investment Code calls on its member
states to deny long term credit from the domestic market to
foreign enterprises.2 38 The individual nations may establish
their own policies on short and medium term domestic credit;
medium term credit is defined as less than three years.239 The
Venezuelan statute has no specific provision on this point, but
SIEX, upon the advice of the Central Bank, must establish the
conditions governing the access of foreign firms to the domes-
tic credit market.240 Finally, Article 15 of the Andean Code
provides that member governments shall refrain from guaran-
teeing foreign private loans, unless the state is a participant in
the project involved.
4. Restrictions on Technology Transfer Contracts
Venezuelan legislation specifically incorporates as domes-
tic law Articles 20 and 25 of the Andean Foreign Investment
Code.24' Article 20 provides that no contract for the transfer of
foreign technology or patents shall be approved if it contains
any of the following clauses: those allowing the supplier to fix
the sale or resale price of the goods produced thereunder; those
prohibiting the use of competing technology; those giving a
purchase option to the technology supplier; those obligating
the licensee to transfer back to the supplier inventions or im-
provements arising out of such technology; those restricting the
volume or structure of production; or those requiring the pur-
chaser to pay royalties on patents which are not used. Save in
234. Id.
235. Id. art. 57.
236. Id. art. 57; see AFIC, supra note 144, art. 16.
237. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 59.
238. Supra note 144, art. 17.
239. Id.
240. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 61.
241. Id. art. 66.
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exceptional circumstances, these contracts may not include
clauses limiting or prohibiting exports of the goods manufac-
tured thereunder. Likewise proscribed are clauses that require
the licensee to employ permanently personnel selected by the
supplier and clauses that limit the licensee to procuring capital
goods, raw materials, intermediate products, or other technol-
ogy from a particular source. This procurement prohibition
may be waived in exceptional cases, so long as the cost of the
item does not exceed the world market price.
Article 25 stipulates that licensing agreements for foreign
trademarks may not incorporate clauses which limit or forbid
exports of the goods produced under the trademark, which fix
the sale or resale price of that product, which obligate the
licensee to pay for an unused trademark, or which require the
user to employ permanently personnel selected by the licensor.
Also these contracts may not compel the licensee to use raw
materials, intermediate goods, or equipment supplied by the
licensor or its affiliate companies; in exceptional cases, the
recipient nation may permit such a clause, if the cost of the
items does not exceed the world market price.
Besides those restrictions, Venezuela has added her own
list of other clauses which may not be included in any trade-
mark, patent, or licensing agreement: those which prohibit the
manufacture or sale of the goods involved after expiration of
the contract; those calling for royalty payments even where the
technology has been "sold" to the user; those which forbid the
use of knowledge or improvements arising out of the technology
after the agreement has expired; those requiring implementa-
tion of specific quality controls; those forbidding the use of
similar trademarks after termination of the contract; those
stipulating that the user will pay the licensor's local taxes on
the royalties; those providing for royalty payments for techni-
cal assistance which has not been transferred; and those calling
for the licensee to give the supplier an irrevocable power to sell
the goods manufactured under the license.2 2
All technology agreements must also obligate the supplier
to train Venezuelan personnel in the use of the technology.2 3
242. Decree 746 of Feb. 11, 1975, art. 1, reprinted in G. PICo MANTILLO, supra note
25, at 331.
243. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 67.
VOL. 7:151
VENEZUELA AND ANCOM
In addition, SIEX, in deciding whether to approve a technology
transfer agreement, may take into account its effect on employ-
ment, on development, on income generation, on the environ-
ment, and on the balance of payments. 44 Finally, the Venezue-
lan Congress has delegated to the President authority to desig-
nate other clauses which must be included in or excluded from
foreign technology contracts.245
Royalty payments between a majority foreign owned sub-
sidiary and its parent or affiliates are prohibited, and such
payments may not be deducted from taxable income.2 " Minor
"occasional services" are excepted from this prohibition, pro-
vided that SIEX approves the amount of the payment. In addi-
tion, foreign enterprises which have agreed to convert into na-
tional or mixed enterprises are exempt from this proscription.2 47
Finally, technology contributions may not be counted as part
of the capital of a company.24"
Formerly, under Venezuelan law, no new technology con-
tract could exceed five years.2 " Under the 1977 change, how-
ever, SIEX may approve contract periods up to fifteen years in
exceptional circumstances.250
5. Miscellaneous Laws Affecting Foreign Investment
SIEX must present to the President for his consideration,
any foreign investment in excess of Bs. 20 million (about U.S.
$5 million).25 ' Although SIEX is empowered to establish the
criteria for foreign investments, the statute does list certain
factors and states the project may be approved if two of such
features are present. These itemized factors are: projects
which, within a reasonable time, will incorporate within their
products a local value added component of at least 51%; pro-
244. ANCOM Decision 84 of May 27, 1974, art. 7, reprinted in G. Plco MANUrLO,
supra note 25, at 367. For an excellent discussion of the application of these laws on
technology transfer, see Pate, Present and Future Venezuelan Technology Policies:
Implementation and Implications for Technology Suppliers and Foreign Investors, 9
LAW. AM. 1 (1977).
245. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 73.
246. AFIC, supra note 144, art. 21; Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 68.
247. Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 69.
248. Id. art. 68.
249. Decree 63, supra note 147, art. 56(e).
250. Decree 2442, supra noe 149, art. 65(e).
251. Id. art. 9(9).
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jects exporting goods which contain at least a 30% local value
added component; investments which will generate a signifi-
cant amount of employment; those located in the lesser devel-
oped areas of the nation; projects which will use vital technol-
ogy; enterprises which agree to convert into national or mixed
companies more rapidly than required by law; and those pro-jects whose organizers promise to reinvest the profits generated
within Venezuela in Portfolio Development Bonds.252
Article 51 of the Andean Foreign Investment Code states
that no investment contract or technology transfer agreement
may contain a clause submitting possible conflicts to a foreign
court. This article also prohibits clauses permitting the subro-
gation of a foreign government to the rights of the investor.
This latter proscription resulted in the suspension of the insur-
ance and guaranty programs of the U.S. Overseas Private In-
vestment Corporation in the ANCOM nations." 3 Neither Vene-
zuelan Decree 2,031 nor Decree 2,442 contains any provisions
similar to this Article 51 of the Andean Code. As indicated
above, however, Venezuela may consider itself bound by such
provisions since the Code has been specifically approved by her
Congress.2 11
III. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The foregoing analysis reveals that, through the Accession
Treaty and subsequently enacted legislation, Venezuela has
managed to mesh her legal structure neatly into a preexisting
common market. There are still a few cloudy areas, such as,
whether the Andean Code's prohibition against foreign court
selection clauses has been incorporated into Venezuela's do-
mestic law. In general, however, it is clear that this nation has
brought her municipal law into close conformity with the inter-
national prescriptions established by ANCOM.
The legal framework laid down by ANCOM and Venezuela
appears to have produced a balanced combination of manda-
tory requirements and essential flexibility. It will be recalled
that the LAFTA Treaty left the actual tariff cutting to future
agreements between its members. For instance, every item to
go on the Common Schedules had to be discussed individually
252. Id. art. 22.
253. 22 U.S.C. § 2197(b)(Supp. V 1975); OPIC Country Lists.
254. See note 25 supra; Decree 2442, supra note 149, art. 1.
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and agreed upon by the nations in subsequent negotiations.
The same was true for each article on which a duty concession
was to be offered under a National Schedule negotiation. Con-
sequently, whenever a particular product was suggested for a
possible concession, the manufacturers of that item could
exert strong pressure on their governments to retain the exist-
ing protective tariffs. Ultimately, the LAFTA countries found
themselves stymied by their inability to offer articles for con-
cessions, and the system ground to a halt.
In contrast, the ANCOM structure removes a good deal of
discretion from its member nations by mandating that certain
actions must occur by fixed dates. Internal duties on nonsched-
uled goods are to be reduced automatically by prescribed per-
centages each year. Nonfavored nations have to abolish duties
on sectorial products from favored countries at once. Every
member had to bring its duties up to the minimum common
external tariff level by a set date. By framing these provisions
in obligatory terms, ANCOM has, to a large extent, freed its
member governments from the political pressures to which
they could otherwise be subjected by every industrialist who
feared outside competition.
On the other hand, if the rules established by a new com-
mon market are overly rigid, the member states will be
tempted to ignore them and the integration effort will fail. The
Central American Common Market Treaty provided for imme-
diate free internal trade.15 Yet when political and commercial
pressures became too great, her members began imposing du-
ties on each other's goods.25 Honduras finally withdrew, and
this integration unit is currently in limbo.
Some observers thought the withdrawal of Chile sounded
the death knell for ANCOM. Chile's action, however, should
perhaps be attributed more to political differences than to any
inherent defect in the ANCOM structure. Moreover, the re-
sponse of ANCOM to this event may indicate a flexibility
255. Multilateral Treaty of Free Trade and Central American Integration (June
10, 1958), art. 1, printed in INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE ON INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
STUDIES, 2 INSTRUMENTS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND IN THE CARIB-
BEAN 365 (1975).
256. Honduras Checks CACM Recovery By Slapping Duties on Region's Goods,
1971 Bus. LATIN AMERICA 8; Costa Rica Import Restrictions Provoke New Crisis in
Central America, 1971 Bus. LATIN AMERICA 193.
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which will allow this common market to survive, not only this
setback, but also future crises. Chile's departure did provide an
opportunity to bring Venezuela into the Metalworking Sec-
torial Program through the reallocation of products previously
assigned to Chile. Many of the ANCOM features to which
Chile had objected and with which Bolivia and Ecuador were
having problems were modified in 1976. The deadlines for duty
reductions were extended by as much as five years. The possi-
bility of attracting foreign investment was increased by relax-
ing the remittances and reinvestments provisions. Nations,
such as Venezuela, appear to have developed an increased sen-
sitivity to the special needs of Bolivia and Ecuador, as evi-
denced by Venezuela's agreement to yield the high density
polyethylene market to Bolivia.
Even the strictest provisions in the ANCOM accords incor-
porate a degree of flexibility. Venezuela was allowed to exclude
236 items from the automatic tariff cutting provisions. Like-
wise, she was permitted to apply discriminatory duties to cer-
tain products from individual member nations in order to pro-
tect key sensitive industries. On the grounds of hardship, she
was authorized to suspend the minimum common external tar-
iff on sixty items. In structuring the Petrochemical Sectorial
Program, the designers made a special concession to satisfy
Venezuela's interest in developing a petrochemical export in-
dustry. The possibilities for relief built into ANCOM's legal
structure, combined with the flexible response of its leadership,
may mean this organization is sufficiently adaptable to sur-
vive.
The Andean region has decided for now to retain its cur-
rent divestment rules. Only time and experience will demon-
strate whether this expanded market can attract sufficient for-
eign capital and technology under these norms. If the results
are favorable, the Andean Foreign Investment Code will have
provided the world community a model whereby foreign influ-
ence on an economy can be reduced, without resort to massive
expropriations.
The Sectorial Program of ANCOM offers an innovative
approach to the need for balanced regional development. It
attempts through the discriminatory tariff structures to give
the favored nations a temporary edge over their competi-
tors-an advantage which may be crucial for Bolivia and Ecua-
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dor. On the other hand, it avoids the outright creation of mo-
nopolies and envisions eventual free competition between na-
tional producers.
Unlike the European Economic Community (EEC),
ANCOM does not have a supranational tribunal to resolve dis-
putes affecting private persons on common market matters.257
The Court of Justice of the EEC has played a vital role in
enforcing the internal free trade obligations, in developing the
antitrust rules, and in determining whether national or com-
munity law prevails.25 In ANCOM no judicial organ is avail-
able to decide whether a member state has violated an
ANCOM law, to rule on exactly how much a certain foreign
company can reinvest, or to ascertain which duty rate should
apply to a particular item in a specific case. If Venezuela
should now pass a statute inconsistent with the Cartagena
Agreement or with an ANCOM Decision, which law would pre-
vail-the Venezuelan national law or the ANCOM rule? Who
will decide this question?
Should decisions of the Colombian Supreme Court on a
common market question conflict with those from Venezuela,
there is no higher tribunal to establish a uniform position on
the issue. Although civil law courts do not follow the theory of
stare decisis, in fact, the existence of the supranational tri-
bunal in the EEC has been highly effective in achieving a con-
sistent pattern of regulation in that market.
Nonetheless, it may be preferable for ANCOM to leave the
creation of a supranational tribunal to the future and to con-
centrate for now on molding her basic structure to fit the eco-
nomic realities as they develop. Merely to implement the nu-
merous and complex ANCOM rules at the nation-state level
poses an enormous task for its members.
Government agencies will need to establish and police
certificates-of-origin systems so that only those goods which
have satisfied the local content rules will receive the advanta-
257. A procedure is established for settling disputes between member states. Car-
tagena Agreement, supra note 7, art. 23, and LAFTA Protocol for the Settlement of
Disputes (Sept. 2, 1967), 7 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 747 (1968).
258. See, e.g., Costa v. Ente nazionale Energia elettrica impress giA della Edison
Volta, 10 Recueil 1141 (July 15, 1964), [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8023 (1965).
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geous internal duty treatment. Onsite inspection of factories by
relatively honest officials will be essential to any meaningful
certificate-of-origin system.
The annual tariff revisions will have to be published and
distributed in a timely fashion to customs offices in the most
remote border towns. Low level customs officers, perhaps with
little formal education, will be expected to make sophisticated
determinations whether the duty on a particular item is the
ANCOM internal rate, the ANCOM common external tariff, a
LAFTA concession rate, a Sectorial Program "favored nation"
rate, or a Sectorial Program nonfavored nation rate. Even de-
ciding under which NABANDINA classification on article falls
can produce disputes.
Practising lawyers within ANCOM will need to become
familiar with the detailed working of this complex tariff struc-
ture, the divestment rules, and the sectorial programs, if they
are to properly advise clients who are planning investments,
reinvesting earnings, or exporting goods. Both judges and attor-
neys will have to perceive when an incorrect duty has been
levied. The attorneys and the courts must ensure that import-
ers, exporters, and other businessmen can depend on litigation
for appropriate enforcement of their rights under the ANCOM
rules.
If ANCOM is to become a viable integration unit, its gov-
erning bodies and its member states should embark on a major
educational effort. Easily understood manuals and lectures
should be prepared and delivered to customs officers at all
levels. The bar associations and the law schools should organize
one-day institutes to provide attorneys with the practical
knowledge they need to apply the ANCOM rules. Scholars
knowledgeable about intricacies of ANCOM could greatly as-
sist in this implementation process by writing short articles
explaining the concrete working of this system to practitioners
and judges. The legal profession, in drafting the ANCOM and
the Venezuelan legislation, has proved itself innovative and
imaginative; now that same profession is called upon to make
these laws effective by training the customs officials, the judici-
ary, and the practising bar.
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